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Abstract The paper introduces a formal framework of communication that cap-
tures not only information that is agreed upon by the interlocutors, but also the
projected continuations of the communicative exchange. It allows for modeling
conjunction, disjunction and denegation of speech acts. Assertions are analyzed
as commitments of interlocutors for the truth of propositions. Questions are con-
versational moves that restrict the continuations to assertions by the other partici-
pant; this allows for a modeling of questions that restricts continuations to just
one assertion. The framework is applied to biased questions, to questions with
high and low negation, and to two types of question tags.
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1 A framework for illocutionary acts
With performing a speech act, a speaker produces a communicative effect, the il-
locutionary act. Such acts change the social relations and obligations of the inter-
locutors; for example, with an assertion, the speaker declares a commitment to the
truth  of  a  proposition.  Hence,  speech  acts  are  transitions,  or  functions,  from
world/time pairs to world/time pairs (cf. Szabolcsi 1982; Krifka 2014). In the cur-
rent paper I will  develop a formal model that captures certain aspects of such
changes, based on Cohen & Krifka (2014). Its crucial property is that it concerns
not only the commitments that have accrued up to the current point in conversa-
tion, but also their licit future developments. This component will be essential for
the modeling of the three empirical phenomena this paper deals with: questions –
especially biased questions –  negation of questions, and question tags. 
The fundamental notion of the model is the commitment state, modeled as  a
set of propositions. This set contains the propositions that are publicly shared by
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the participants. The basic function of speech acts is to
change a commitment state. I will write Aφ for an illocu-
tionary act that adds the proposition φ to the commit-
ment state c, using graphical notation as in Figure 1.
(1) Update of commitment state c with speech act Aφ 
c + Aφ = c ⋃ {φ}. 
There  are  certain  requirements  for  pragmatically  licit  updates.  Ideally,  the
proposition φ is not entailed by c; otherwise, φ would be redundant. More impor-
tantly, the proposition φ should be consistent with the propositions in c. We can-
not  require consistency as a strict condition, as speakers often have inconsistent
beliefs, but there should not be any blatant inconsistencies, like a proposition and
its negation being part of the same commitment state. 
The notion of commitment states and their possible continuations naturally
leads to the modeling of an information state in discourse that includes the ex-
pected or “legal” continuations of a commitment state. I call this a commitment
space (CS); it is modeled as a set of commitment states.
(2) C is a commitment space if C is a set of commitment states, 
⋂C ≠ ∅ and ⋂C ∈ C
We call ⋂C the root of C, and write √C. It is the set of all propositions that the
participants have positively committed to up to the current point in conversation. 
The notion of update of a commitment state by an illocutionary act can be
generalized to commitment spaces, as in (3):
(3) Update of a commitment space with
an illocutionary act A, where A is de-
fined for commitment states:
C + A = {c∈C | √C + A ⊆ c}
For  illustration,  consider  the  update  in
Figure 2. The commitment space C has √C
as its  root.  The speech act  Aφ  updates  the
commitment  space  C,  leading to  the  com-
mitment space C + Aφ, which is furthermore
updated by  Aψ,  leading to the commitment
space C + Aφ + Aψ. 
One important application of commitment spaces is  denegations of speech
acts (cf. Cohen & Krifka 2014). It has been acknowledged since Searle (1969)
that speech acts can undergo some sort of negation, as in (4):
(4) I don’t promise to come (≠ I promise not to come). 
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Figure 2: Updates of commitment space
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(4) is different from I promise not to come. Denegations have been expressed by
simply putting a negation sign in front of a logical representation of a speech act
(as in Searle & Vanderveken 1985), but as speech acts are not propositions, it is
unclear what this should mean. Hare (1970) proposed that they are refusals to
make certain speech acts. We can model this with commitment spaces as follows:
(5) Update of a commitment space 
with the denegation of A:
C + ~A = C — [C + A]
Figure 3 illustrates the denegation of a speech
act  introducing the proposition φ,  which is dis-
tinct  from  the  speech  act  that  introduces  the
proposition ¬φ. Notice that denegation does not
change  the  root  of  the  commitment  space,  but
prunes its legal developments. Such moves have
been called meta speech act because they delim-
its the options for future speech acts (see Cohen
& Krifka 2014).
Cohen & Krifka (2014) also introduce the operations of conjunction and dis-
junction on speech acts, defined as set union and set intersection, respectively:
(6) Speech act conjunction: C + [A & B] = [C + A] ⋂ [C + B]
 ≈ C + A + B, ≈ C + B + A
(7) Speech act disjunction: C + [A V B] = [C + A] ⋃ [C + B]
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Figure 3: 
Update with denegation of φ vs. ¬φ
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Figure 5: 
Disjunction of regular and meta speech acts
Figure 4: 
Conjunction of regular and meta speech acts
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Conjunction leads to sets of commitment states that are rooted, that is, to a regular
commitment space, cf. Figure 4. In case that there are no anaphoric ties between
the speech acts, we get the same result as with sequential update. With disjunc-
tions, only meta speech acts result in commitment spaces that are properly rooted;
regular speech acts lead to non-rooted sets of commitment states, cf.  Figure 5.
Hence disjunction is not defined for speech acts in general. (However, a new root
might be created by updating √C with the proposition [φ∨ψ] first.)
We have introduced commitment  states and commitment spaces, but we are
not quite done yet. There are certain conversational moves that amount to a rejec-
tion of a move by the other participant. For this (and perhaps for other ways of re-
ferring back to points in conversation) we need a record of the moves in conversa-
tion so far. We model this as a sequence of commitment spaces ⟨C0, C1, … Cn⟩,
which we call  Commitment Space Developments (CSD).  For regular speech
acts or meta speech acts, update of commitment space developments is as follows:
(8) Update of a commitment space development with a speech act A:  
⟨..., C⟩ + A = ⟨..., C, C+A⟩
CSDs are also a good place to indicate the actor of a speech act, that is, the
participant that performed the speech act. I will do this by superscripting the up-
date sign + and the result of the update by the participant.
(9) Update of a commitment space development with speech act A by actor S:
⟨..., CS′⟩ +S A = ⟨..., CS′, [C + A]S⟩
The rejection of of the last speech act is expressed by an operator R, which
returns to the next-to-last commitment state while keeping a record of the rejec-
tion process. R is defined in (10), where the star * stands for any actor. The last of
these commitment stages would correspond the notion of a “Table” in Farkas &
Bruce 2010, i.e., the conversational stage under negation.
(10) ⟨..., C*, C′*⟩ +S R = ⟨..., C*, C′*, CS⟩
We have used + to indicate the update of commitment states,  commitment
spaces, and CSDs. Notice that this is shorthand for functional application: 
(11) a. c + Aφ  =  Aφ(c), where Aφ = λc[c⋃φ]
b. C + A = A(C), where A = λC{c∈C | √C + A ⊆ c} 
c. ⟨..., C*⟩ +S A = AS(⟨..., C*⟩), where AS = λ⟨..., C*⟩ ⟨..., C, [A(C)]S⟩
d. ⟨..., C⟩ +S R = RS(⟨..., [C]...⟩), where RS = λ⟨..., C′*, C*⟩, ⟨..., C*, C′*, CS⟩
 It is obvious that the way speech acts are modeled is inspired by modal logic,
with the process of update as an accessibility relation. This type of modality could
be called conversational modality. 
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2 Assertions and reactions to assertions
We will now consider the speech act that is arguably the most typical for human
language, assertion. I follow Brandom (1983) in assuming that with asserting a
proposition, the speaker undertakes  responsibility for what is claimed, by pub-
licly committing himself to the truth of that proposition. I express the proposition
that a speaker S is committed to the truth of a proposition φ with “S⊢φ”, honoring
the origin of the turnstile ⊢ in Frege’s “Begriffsschrift” of 1879, where the verti-
cal stroke expresses judgement of the speaker. 
It has been claimed that with an assertion of a proposition, a speaker wants to
make the addressee believe this proposition (see Bach & Harnish 1979). But this
comes about as a secondary effect, otherwise (12a,b) would be contradictions.  
(12) a. Believe it or not, I won the race. 
b. I don’t care whether you believe me, but I won the race.
Such examples show that the wish to make the other person believe the proposi-
tion is cancelable, hence a conversational implicature of the assertion. It comes
about because the public commitment to the truth of a proposition that is false car-
ries  social  risks of losing honor,  or face,  something that  the speaker wants to
avoid; this constitutes a reason for the addressee to believe the proposition.
It has also been claimed that in an assertion, the speaker expresses that the
speaker believes the asserted proposition, which then constitutes a reason for the
hearer to believe the proposition (see Lauer 2013). This would explain Moore’s
paradox, the pragmatic infelicity of assertions like #It is raining but I don’t be-
lieve it. But again, this is just a side effect. If asserting a proposition φ were the
same as expressing that S₁ believes φ, then (13a) and (b) would mean the same. 
(13) a. Ed won the race.
b. I believe that Ed won the race. 
In fact, (13b) is not a commitment to the proposition that Ed won the race, but a
commitment to the proposition of having a belief that Ed won the race. This can
be used to make the addressee accept the proposition that Ed won the race if the
addressee considers the speaker a reasonable person. 
Under the assumption that assertions express public commitments, the asser-
tion of a proposition φ by a speaker S₁ should have the following effect:  
(14) ⟨..., C*⟩ +S₁ S₁⊢φ = ⟨..., C*, [C + S₁⊢φ]S₁⟩
= ⟨..., C*, {c ⊆ C | √C + S₁⊢φ  ⊆ c}S₁⟩
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How are assertions formally expressed? I assume that the commitment S₁⊢φ
itself is expressed in its own phrasal category, which I will  call  Commitment
phrase (CmP). I will use the sign ⊢ for the head of an assertive CmP. In addition,
I assume the existence of a speech act phrase, or Act phrase (ActP). This is remi-
niscent of the speech act phrase (SAP) of Speas 2004, but its role is different, as it
will distinguish between assertions and questions, which are both related to com-
mitments. For assertions, the head of the ActP will be rendered by “.”. In speech,
this is expressed by falling prosody of the intonational phrase that corresponds to
the speech act (see Truckenbrodt 2015). (15) illustrates the basic structure. 
(15) [ActP [[Actº . ] [CmP [[Cmº ⊢ ] [TP I won the race]]]]]
(16) [ActP I [[Actº . won] [CmP [tI [Cmº ⊢ twon] [TP tI twon the race]]]]]
We can assume that the finite verb undergoes head movement, and that the
subject moves via the specifiers to occupy the SpecActP, as illustrated in (16) (see
Truckenbrodt 2006). For interpretation purposes, I will assume that these move-
ments are reconstructed, and work with the structure in (15). Interpretation is with
respect to a function ⟦...⟧S₁S₂ that specifies the speaker S1  and the addressee S2. I
assume that the TP denotes a proposition, with I referring to the speaker.  
(17) ⟦[ActP [[Actº . ] [CmP [[Cmº ⊢ ] [TP I won the race]]]]]⟧S₁S₂
= ⟦[Actº . ]⟧S₁S₂(⟦[[Cmº ⊢] [TP I won the race]]⟧S₁S₂)
= ⟦[Actº . ]⟧S₁S₂(⟦[Cmº ⊢]⟧S₁S₂(⟦[TP I won the race]⟧S₁S₂))
with ⟦[TP I won the race]⟧S₁S₂ = ‘S1 won the race’
⟦[Cmº ⊢]⟧S₁S₂ = λpλS[S⊢p]
 ⟦[Actº . ]⟧S₁S₂ = λRλ⟨..., C*⟩[⟨..., C*, [C + R(S₁)]S₁⟩]
= λ⟨..., C*⟩ [⟨..., C*, [C + S₁⊢‘S₁ won the race’]S₁⟩]
This is a function that updates the last CS of a CSD, as illustrated in (18).
(18) (17)(⟨..., C*⟩) = ⟨..., C*, [C + S₁⊢‘S₁ won the race’]S₁⟩
= ⟨..., C*⟩ +S₁ S₁⊢φ, for short.  
Notice that [Cmº ⊢] is interpreted as function λpλS[S⊢p], which does not specify
the committing participant S yet. This is achieved by [Actº . ], which involves appli-
cation of R to the speaker S₁, and marking the last move as one of the speaker S₁.
Thus CmP and the ActP have different functions; while CmP with its head ⊢ iden-
tifies the nature of the speech act, the ActP with identifies the nature of the update
by identifying the actor and passing it on to the CmP.
I have argued in Section 2 that by adding the commitment S₁⊢φ, speaker S₁
typically intends to make S₂ accept the proposition φ itself.  I will model this by
assuming that (14) gives rise to a second update, this time of φ itself. This update
is cancelable, cf. (12), hence it has the status of a conversational implicature. The
full effect of a standard assertion then is as in (19) and in Figure 6. 
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(19) ⟨..., C*⟩ +S₁ S1⊢ φ  +S₁ φ 
 = ⟨..., C*, [C + S1⊢φ]S₁, [C + S1⊢φ + φ]S₁⟩
Let us now consider typical  reactions to assertions.
Speaker S₂ can simply acknowledge the assertion by S₁
with utterances like  Okay, Mmh,  or nodding. In this, S₂
confirms the last move of S₁. Another kind of reaction is
by response particles like yes and no. As argued in Krifka
2013, such particles are sentential anaphors that pick up
recently  introduced  propositions,  where  yes asserts  the
sentential anaphor, and no asserts its negation. The propo-
sitional discourse referent is introduced by the TP of the
antecedent clause. 
(20) S₁: [ActP [[.] [CmP [[⊢] [TP I won the race]]]]] introduction of propositional
 ↪ φ discourse referent φ
S₂: Yes. +S₂ S₂⊢φ assert φ
S₂: No. +S₂ S₂⊢¬φ  assert negation of φ
(21) illustrates confirmation by yes. Contradiction by no as in (22) requires a re-
traction R, because otherwise the resulting commitment state would contain both
φ and S₂⊢¬φ, which is incoherent. 
(21) (19) + S₂: Yes. = (19) +S₂ S₂⊢φ
= ⟨..., C*, [C + S1⊢φ]S₁, [C + S1⊢φ + φ]S₁, [C + S1⊢φ + φ + S2⊢φ]S₂⟩
(22) (19) + S2: No. = (19) +S₂ R +S₂ S2⊢¬φ
= ⟨..., C*, [C + S1⊢φ]S₁, [C + S1⊢φ + φ]S₂, [C + S1⊢φ]S₂, [C + S1⊢φ + S2⊢¬φ]S₂⟩
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The resulting commitment space contains the information that S1 is committed
to φ, and that S2 is committed to ¬φ. Hence, S₁ and S₂ contradict each other. Ac-
knowledgement, confirmation and contradiction are illustrated in  Figure 7. Re-
traction R is enacted when necessary; it is not a feature of the response particle
no itself. If the antecedent clause contains a negation, as in I didn’t win the race,
an answer like No, you didn’t does not involve a retraction (see Krifka 2013).
3 Polar questions and reactions to polar questions
The current framework creates the possibility of analyzing questions as a deriva-
tive of other speech acts, in particular, assertions. With an information question, a
speaker requests an assertion of a particular type from the other speaker. This can
be modeled by a meta speech act that does not change the root of the commitment
space, but restricts the possible continuations – to those in which the other speaker
makes an assertion of an appropriate type. 
A yes/no  question,  or  polar  question,  is  classically  analyzed  as  offering  a
choice  between  two  alternatives,  a  proposition  and  its  negation  (cf.  Hamblin
1973). This can be expressed in the current framework as in (23) and Figure 8.
tional discourse referent introduced by the question. 
(24) a. (23) + S2: Yes. = (23) +S₂ S2⊢φ b. (23) + S2: No. = (23) +S₂ S2⊢¬φ
Non-congruent answers like I don’t know can be expressed after a prior retrac-
tion of the last move. Retraction is required because the resulting commitment
space could not contain both the information S2⊢φ  and S2⊢‘S2 does not know
whether φ’, or S2⊢‘S2 does not want to tell whether φ’. 
(25) (23) +S₂ R +S₂ S2: I don’t know. =  ⟨..., C*, [{√C} ⋃ C + S2⊢φ ⋃ C ⋃ S2⊢¬φ]S₁, 
           CS₂, [C + S2⊢‘¬S2 knows whether φ’]S₂⟩
Figure 9 and Figure 10 illustrate congruent answers by yes and no, which do
not require retraction, and a refusal to answer, which does. This corresponds to the
standard treatment of polar questions as presenting an option between two alterna-
tives; I will call such questions  bipolar. But questions may be skewed towards
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one answer, so-called  biased questions. One example are declarative questions
with assertive syntax, but rising prosody (Gunlogson 2002). 
(26) I won the race? 
Standard question theories have problems with biased questions; they have to
resort to extraneous means to highlight one option over others (see e.g., Inquisi-
tive Semantics; Farkas & Roelofson 2015). In the current framework there is a
natural way to represent question bias: A speaker can propose just one legal con-
tinuation to the addressee. I will call such moves monopolar questions.
(27) ⟨..., C*⟩ + S1, to S2: I won the race? 
= ⟨..., C*, [{√C} ⋃ C + S2⊢φ]S₁⟩
Notice that the answer  yes is straightforward, whereas the
answer no requires a prior rejection. This reflects the bias of
such questions towards one particular answer. 
(28) a. (27) + S₂: Yes. =  (27) +S₂ S₂⊢φ
b. (27) + S₂: No. =  (27) +S₂ R +S₂ S₂: No. 
 = ⟨..., C*, [{√C} ⋃ C + S₂⊢φ]S₁, C*, [C + S₂⊢φ]S₂⟩
There is evidence that standard English polarity questions like Did I win the
race? have a biased reading as well. This is evident with questions that contain a
propositional negation. In standard analyses, such questions have the same read-
ing as their non-negated counterparts. However, this is contrary to fact; they are
biased towards their (negated) proposition. 
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(29) ⟨..., C...⟩ + S1, to S2: Did I not win the race?
= ⟨..., C*, [{√C} ⋃ C + S₂⊢¬φ]S₁⟩
How are question meanings constructed? We assume that they are based on an
Act phrase head [Actº ? ] that requests the commitment denoted by the complement
of the ActP to be performed by the addressee. (30) gives a full derivation. We as-
sume that the specifier position of the ? act phrase remains empty, and that auxil-
iaries undergo head movement to [Actº ? ]. Notice that the ? head identifies the
committer as S₂, the addressee; the actor of the speech act itself remains S₁. 
(30) ⟦[ActP [[Actº ? Did ] [CmP [[Cmº ⊢ tdid ] [TP I tdid win the race]]]]]⟧S₁S₂
= ⟦[Actº ? ]⟧S₁S₂(⟦[[Cmº ⊢] [TP I did win the race]]⟧S₁S₂)
= ⟦[Actº ? ]⟧S₁S₂(⟦[Cmº ⊢]⟧S₁S₂(⟦[TP I did win the race]⟧S₁S₂))
with ⟦[TP I won the race]⟧S₁S₂ = ‘S₁ won the race’
⟦[Cmº ⊢]⟧S₁S₂ = λpλS[S⊢p]
 ⟦[Actº ? ]⟧S₁S₂ = λRλ⟨..., C*⟩[⟨..., C*, [{√C} ⋃ C + R(S₂)]S₁⟩]  (S₂!)  
= λ⟨..., C*⟩ [⟨..., C*, [{√C} ⋃ C + S₂⊢‘S1 won the race’]S₁⟩] 
This results in the monopolar question interpretation of standard polar ques-
tions with a compositional meaning. For declarative questions as in (26) we can
assume a syntactic structure in which the ? interpretation of the ActP is triggered
by rising prosody of the intonational phrase that corresponds to the speech act.  
What  about  the  derivation of  the  bipolar interpretation? I  assume that  it
comes about as a result of a disjunction of monopolar questions. Disjunction of
CSDs ⟨..., CS⟩ V ⟨..., C′S⟩ amounts to the set union of the final commitment space,
⟨..., CS ⋃ C′S⟩, and disjunction of two functions on CSDs λ⟨...⟩[⟨..., CS⟩]  V λ⟨...⟩
[⟨..., C′S⟩] amounts to the disjunction of their arguments, λ⟨...⟩[⟨..., CS⟩ V ⟨..., C′S⟩].
The role of disjunction is obvious with alterna-
tive  questions  as  in  (31).  It  results  in  a  bipolar
question, as illustrated in Figure 12. Notice that the
existence of alternative questions like  (31) is  an-
other  piece  of  evidence  that  a  canonical  polarity
question like Did I win the race? has a monopolar
reading; otherwise such disjunctions would be re-
dundant. 
(31) S₁ to S₂: Did I win the race, or not?
= ⟦[ActP Did I win the race]⟧S₁S₂ V ⟦[ActP did I not win the race]⟧S₁S₂
= λ⟨..., C*⟩[⟨..., C*, [{√C} ⋃ C + S2⊢‘S1 won the race’] 
     ⋃ [{√C}⋃ C + S₂⊢¬‘S₁ won the race’]S₁⟩]
This strategy of forming bipolar question is evident in Chinese A-not-A ques-
tions, in contrast to questions marked by the final particle  ma, which have a bi-
ased, i.e., monopolar reading (see Li & Thompson 1981). For example, whereas
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Figure 12: 
Disjunction of monopolar questions
+S2⊢¬φ+S2⊢φ
√C        S₁: S₁:
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(32a) can be used as a neutral information question, it is inappropriate in a context
in which the speaker sees the addressee eating an apple. 
(32) a. Nī chí  bu chí píngguo? b. Nǐ chí píngguo ma?
you eat   not eat apple you eat apple         QU
 ‘Do you eat apples?’ ‘Do you eat apples?’, ‘You eat apples?’
But how does a canonical polarity question in English receive a bipolar read-
ing that results in a non-biased question? Let us first consider the analysis of alter-
native questions like (33a) and constituent questions like (33b).
(33) a. Did Ed meet Ann, Beth, or Carla? 
b. Who did Ed meet?
The alternative question (33a) can be analyzed by assuming that the alterna-
tive phrase [DP Ann, Beth, or Carla] scopes out to SpecActP on the level of logical
form, where it is interpreted as a disjunction over speech acts. 
(34) ⟦[ActP [DP Ann, Beth, or Carla]i 
     [Act′ [Actº ?-did] [CmP [[Cmº ⊢] [TP Ed tdid meet ti]]]]]⟧S₁S₂
= ⟦[DP Ann, Beth, or Carla]⟧S₁S₂
 (λxi ⟦[Act′ [Actº ?-did] [CmP [[Cmº ⊢] [TP Ed tdid meet ti]]]]⟧S₁S₂,tᵢ/xᵢ)
with ⟦[DP Ann, Beth, or Carla]⟧S₁S₂ 
= λR[R(Ann) V R(Beth) V R(Carla)]
and λxi⟦[Act′ [Actº ?-did] [CmP [[Cmº ⊢] [TP Ed tdid meet ti]]]]⟧S₁S₂,tᵢ/xᵢ
 = λxi λ⟨..., C*⟩[⟨..., C*, [{√C} ⋃ C + S₂⊢‘Ed met xi’]S₁⟩
= λ⟨..., C*⟩[⟨..., C*, [⟨..., C*, [{√C} ⋃ C + S₂⊢‘Ed met Ann’
 ⋃ C + S₂⊢‘Ed met Beth’
⋃ C + S₂⊢‘Ed met Carla’]S₁⟩]
Taking φa, φb and φc as abbreviations for the respec-
tive  propositions,  this  results  in  the  commitment
space illustrated in Figure 13. The developments are
restricted to one of the three assertions by S₂, that
Ed met Ann, that Ed met Beth, or that Ed met Carla.
Constituent questions like (33b) work in a simi-
lar  way,  with  the  exception that  in  languages  that
show wh-movement like English SpecActP is filled
explicitly, with the wh expression. 
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Figure 13: Alternative question
+S2⊢φa





(35) ⟦[ActP [DP which woman]i 
     [Act′ [Actº ?-did] [CmP [[Cmº ⊢] [TP Ed tdid meet ti]]]]]⟧S₁S₂
= ⟦[DP which woman]⟧S₁S₂
 (λxi ⟦[Act′ [Actº ?-did] [CmP [[Cmº ⊢] [TP Ed tdid meet ti]]]]⟧S₁S₂,tᵢ/xᵢ)
with ⟦[DP which woman]⟧S₁S₂ = λR V  [R(x)]
 x∈⟦woman⟧
= λ⟨..., C*⟩[⟨..., C*, [⟨..., C*, [{√C}⋃ ⋂{C + S₂⊢‘Ed met xi’| xi∈Woman}]S₁⟩]
Alternative questions and constituent questions have been interpreted as in-
volving a disjunction over an abstraction of a monopolar question speech act, re-
sulting in a speech act disjunction. I suggest that this is also the mechanism by
which a polar question, with basic monopolar interpretation, gets its bipolar read-
ing. This is mediated by a  polarity phrase, PolP, which is involved in cases of
negation and of verum focus. I assume a trace T in the polarity phrase that can ei-
ther be specified by the verum operator, λp[p], or the falsum operator, λp[¬p]. I
also assume that this structure is interpreted disjunctively – as with alternative and
wh-questions – by a phonologically empty operator D, cf. (36).
(36) [ActP D λT[Act′[Actº ? ][CmP [[⊢] [PolP [[Polº T-did] [TP I tdid win the race]]]]]]]
Under the assumptions in (37) we get the right result, a bipolar reading. When ap-
plied to a CSD with final commitment space C, this will yield the commitment
space illustrated in Figure 12 above. 
(37) With ⟦D⟧S₁S₂ = λR[R(λp[p]) V R(λp[¬p])]
and ⟦λT[Act′[Actº ? ][CmP [[⊢] [PolP [[Polº T-did] [TP I tdid win the race]]]]]]⟧S₁S₂
= λTλ⟨..., C*⟩[⟨..., C*, [{√C} ⋃ C + S₂⊢ T(‘S₁ won the race)]S₁⟩]
⟦(36)⟧S₁S₂ = λ⟨..., C*⟩[⟨..., C*, [{√C}⋃ C + S₂⊢ ‘S₁ won the race’
⋃ C + S₂⊢ ¬‘S₁ won the race’]S₂⟩]
In this section I have proposed a new notion, monopolar questions, which pro-
pose one continuation by an assertion of the addressee. This can be used to model
biased questions without any additional device that identifies one alternative over
other alternatives. Monopolar questions allow for a  straightforward analysis of al-
ternative questions and of constituent questions as involving speech act disjunc-
tions. Bipolar questions can be derived as explicit question disjunction.
4 Negated questions
We have seen in (29) that a question with a propositional negation in a TP should
be interpreted as a monopolar question. It is well-known that there is another type
of negation in questions, so-called high negation (see Ladd 1981; Romero 2005;
Repp 2012), as illustrated in (38)
(38) Didn’t I win the race? 
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There are a number of analyses of such questions, in particular by Romero & Han
(2002) and Romero (2005), who propose an interaction with the VERUM opera-
tor,  Repp 2013,  who proposes an interaction with the FALSUM operator,  and
Krifka (to appear), who proposes that they express speech act denegation. These
theories can account for the high syntactic position of negation in such cases.
There are others, such as Asher & Reese 2007, who assume that speech acts like
(38) express a combination of a question and an assertion, that apparently cannot
account for this fact about syntax/semantics mapping. 
I propose that questions such as  (38) express a negation on the level of the
commitment phrase; this explains the high syntactic position of negation. 
(39) ⟦[ActP[[Actº ? Did] [CmP n’t [[Cmº⊢] [TP I tdid win the race]]]]⟧S₁S₂ 
=  ⟦[Actº ?]⟧S₁S₂(⟦not⟧S₁S₂(⟦⊢⟧S₁S₂ (⟦[TP I did win the race]⟧S₁S₂)))
= λ⟨..., C*⟩[⟨..., C*, [{√C} ⋃ C + ¬S2⊢φ]S₁⟩]
tional discourse referent φ that can be picked up by no, which asserts its negation,
¬φ. The answer yes requires a rejection of the last move in  (39). The reaction I
don’t know does not require a rejection, as it is compatible with S₂ being not com-
mitted to φ. 
This relation of strength captures the usage conditions of questions with high
negation, in contrast to questions with low, propositional negation and questions
without any negation. These conditions have been discussed in Büring & Gunlog-
son 2000 in relation to the contextual evidence. Consider the situations in (40).
(40) a. S₁ looks at the yellow pages of a small town, finds a restaurant “V-Day”
b. S₁ has no information but considers eating in a vegetarian restaurant. 
c. S₁ looks at the yellow pages of a small town, only finds restaurants like 
“Meateater’s delight”, “The Big T-Bone”, etc.
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In (40a) there is contextual evidence that there is a vegetarian restaurant, (b) is
rather neutral but expresses an interest in the truth of the proposition that there is a
vegetarian restaurant, and in (c) there is evidence that there is no such restaurant.
Now consider the three questions with no, low, and high negation. 
(41) i. S₁: Is there a vegetarian restaurant around here?
ii. S₁: Is there no vegetarian restaurant around here?
iii.S₁: Isn’t there a vegetarian restaurant around here?
The following table specifies the combination of contexts and acceptable uses.
Contextual evidence (i) no neg. (ii) low neg. (iii) high neg.
(a) There is a vegetarian restaurant ok (mono) # #
(b) neutral ok (bi) # ok
(c) There is no vegetarian restaurant (#) ok ok
Table 1
Büring & Gunlogson 2000 assume that questions with no negation (i) either have
a bias towards the proposition (a), or have no bias (b). In the current theory, this
can be explained by the ambiguity of such questions between a monopolar read-
ing, which is appropriate in setting (a) because there is evidence for the proposed
assertion, and a bipolar reading, which is appropriate in setting (b) because both
assertions can be made with roughly the same a-priori likelihood. The question
with no negation is somewhat inappropriate in setting (c): The monopolar reading
is bad because it  identifies a proposition for which there is  no contextual evi-
dence,  and  the  bipolar  reading  suggests  that  either  assertion  is  about  equally
likely. – The question with low negation (ii) only has a monopolar reading, as the
bipolar interpretation is blocked by the corresponding question without negation.
As it expresses a bias towards the negated proposition, it is acceptable only in set-
ting (c). – The question with high negation (iii) is weaker than (ii). It is clearly im-
possible in setting (a): As there is evidence for φ,  there is no reason to check
whether the addressee would not commit to φ. In setting (c), the question is ap-
propriate; in contrast to the question with low negation, it allows answers like  I
don’t know without prior rejection. Büring & Gunlogson assume that the question
with high negation is fine in setting (b) as well, but notice that context (b) is not
completely neutral: There is some interest in eating out in a vegetarian restaurant.
Posing the high-negation question allows more easily for a non-committing an-
swer in this case. 
5 Question tags
We finally consider question tags as conversational moves that affect the nature of
assertion. According to Cattell 1973, question tags come in two varieties. A so-
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call matching question tag as in (42) indicates that the assertion is put forward as
a potential view of the listener. With a reverse question tag as in (43), which has
the opposite polarity of the host clause, the speaker offers his or her own opinion,
and asks for agreement by the addressee. 
(42) You are tired, are you? 
(43) a. I have won the race, haven’t I? b. I haven’t won the race, have I?
Matching question tags can be analyzed as speech act  conjunction of an as-
sertion and a monopolar question, as illustrated in (44) and in Figure 15.
(44) I have won the race, have I? 
C +S₁ [⟦[ActP [ . ] [CmP [⊢] [TP I have won the race]]]⟧S₁S₂ & 
  ⟦[ActP [ ? ] [CmP [⊢] [TP I have won the race]]]⟧S₁S₂]
tral area in Figure 15 as new commitment space. S₁ can propose S₂⊢φ  because φ
is understood as a commitment that S₂ has already anyway; this captures Cattell’s
characterization of matching question tags as voicing a likely opinion of the ad-
dressee. If S₂ does not react, then the proposed commitments obtain. S₂ can react
with yes, a move that is actually redundant given the root of the new commitment
space of (44). If S₂ reacts with no and thus asserts ¬φ, this requires a previous re-
ject operation, which will also reject that S1 is committed to φ. In this feature, an
assertion with a matching tag differs from a simple assertion; if rejected by the ad-
dressee, the speaker is still committed to the truth of the proposition. Again, this
corresponds to Cattell’s characterization of matching question tags. 
We now turn to reverse question tags, which I will analyze by speech act dis-
junction. (45) and Figure 16 illustrate the analysis for the example with positive
host clause and negated tag. I interpret the negation the question tag as low nega-
tion; an analysis in terms of high negation is possible as well.
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(45) I have won the race, haven’t I? 
C +S₁ [⟦[ActP [ . ] [CmP [⊢] [TP I have won the race]]]⟧S₁S₂ V 
  ⟦[ActP [ ? have’nt ] [CmP  [⊢ ] [TP [[tn’t] [TP I thave won the race]]]]]⟧S₁S₂]
= [C + S₁⊢φ] ⋃ [{√C}⋃ C + S₂⊢¬φ]
or to retract it and even assert ¬φ, without contradicting an earlier commitment.
This corresponds Cattell’s characterization of reverse question tags. Also, the dis-
junction as basic operation is evident in languages that use overt disjunction in
question tags, as in German, see (46)
(46) Ich hab das Rennen gewonnen, oder?
I      have the   race         won,              or
‘I won the race, didn’t I?’
6 Conclusion
This article developed a theory of conversational update by speech acts that does
not only model the current common ground (called commitment state), but also its
projected continuation (the commitment space). This leads to a new conception of
questions as conversational moves in which the speaker suggests particular asser-
tions by the addressee. This view allows for “monopolar” questions that offer just
one option for continuation. I argued that this is the proper analysis of biased
questions,  and proposed new analyses  of  alternative  questions  and constituent
questions as disjoined monopolar questions. I have analyzed high-negation ques-
tions as projected non-commitments by the addressee, and of matching / reverse
question tags as conjunctions / disjunctions of an assertion and a question. 
I would like to highlight one promising aspect of the framework developed
here: It distinguishes between the actor or instigator of a speech act and the com-
mitter of a proposition. In regular assertions, these roles are both assumed by the
speaker; in a question, the speaker is the instigator, and the addressee the commit-
ter, of the projected commitment. This provides a new handle on  conjunct-dis-
junct systems in languages like Newari, where the conjunct form appears to index
the committer, the speaker in assertions, and the addressee in questions. Further-
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more, it provides a new way of dealing with assertions like Mary says it will rain
tomorrow, which appear to add the embedded proposition to he common ground,
rather than the proposition that Mary believes it.  We can see this as an act in
which the speaker adds a commitment “on behalf” of Mary, who is the committer,
a proxy speech act in the sense of Krifka (2014). 
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